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In some sense, every belief is a belief it is hard to think critically about, because that is the nature 
of belief. But every belief is hard to think critically about, also, because that is the nature of critical 
thinking: it is hard work; unsettling our settled notions, refusing to let them “stay put” like 
Daedalus’ statues. Let us grant, then, that while some beliefs are more entrenched than others, 
harder to think about than others, all beliefs if they are genuinely held present this challenge: let 
us thus level the pedagogical playing field by assuming that if a student has a belief, it will be hard 
for that student to think critically about it. The strategies for thinking about entrenched beliefs 
should thus be no different than the strategies for thinking about any belief. If this is our 
assumption, then we can proceed to motivate students to want to work hard at this important 
intellectual undertaking, and think that by addressing such motivation we have a realistic chance 
of beliefs of whatever stripe being changed on the basis of critical reflection, even if strictly 
speaking the chances are slim. It is only when this notion is internalized in pedagogues and students 
alike that there can be hope of changing intellectual orientations in students by more than just one 
standard deviation on a critical thinking exam (Arum and Roska, 2011): motivation is the key. 
Kingsbury and Bowell acknowledge this interpretation in their introduction, but their treatment of 
intransigent beliefs (a redundant phrase, I think, in the context of critical thinking pedagogy), while 
interesting and thoughtful, left me somewhat unencouraged and unfulfilled.  
 
2. Should critical thinkers seek the truth? 
 
While I found much to agree with in the spirit of pedagogical solidarity when I read a paper such 
as Kingsbury’s and Bowell’s, there was also much I found I must disagree with strenuously. My 
biggest complaint comes from their explicitly stated conception of critical thinking, which 
becomes apparent when they say that “the very point of critical thinking is the forming of true 
beliefs and the avoidance of false ones.” But this is most surely too high an expectation for a 
critical thinking course, a college education, or even a lifetime of learning. Critical thinkers should 
use truth as an orienting ideal, but grounding the point and purpose of critical thinking in such 
strong epistemological terms throws the baby out with the bathwater when it comes to good 
reasoning that might produce false beliefs, or poor reasoning that produces true beliefs: of course 
we should want to avoid those false beliefs and would prefer true ones, but for fallible, reasoning 
people who are so perniciously prone to bias and fallacious reasoning, isn’t being motivated to 
think critically, and then managing to adhere to better criteria of good judgment more our aim, 
especially when instructing 18-24 year olds? We think we will more realistically get at the truth if 
we reason in such ways, but it is the cogency of the judgment-making that should concern us in 
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teaching critical thinking, not so much the truth value of the judgements reached. After all, how 
are we to judge by this standard if a student has been a good critical thinker when deciding who to 
vote for (or whether to vote to all)? There is no “truth” to the matter, but one might surely make 
the decision in more or less critical ways (that is to say, more according to appropriate standards 
of judgment-making).  
Allow me to quote at length Harvey Siegel (1989), whose view I regard as definitive in this 
matter (though contentious among epistemological anti-realists):  
 
So long as critical thinking involves believing on the basis of reasons, and so long 
as particular claims which students are considering must be assessed in accord with 
the reasons which students actually have or can get … then the power of reasons to 
force a conclusion must be seen as always open. Even very powerful reasons for or 
against some claim q can be wrong, misleading, or overturned by evidence not yet 
available. In teaching students to be critical thinkers, we do not in the first instance 
instruct them to believe only what is true. Of course we do think that believing on 
the basis of reasons is a reliable guide to believing what is true, at least generally. 
Nevertheless, in teaching students to be critical thinkers, we encourage them to 
believe (and act) on the basis of reasons which are properly evaluated. In doing so 
we let the truth fall where it may, and regard the student who justifiedly believes q, 
which is false, despite the evidence in its favor, as a more successful critical thinker 
than the student who believes not-q, which is true, despite the evidence to the 
contrary. Critical thinking involves believing rationally, on the basis of reasons; 
such belief must, from the point of view of our theoretical understanding of critical 
thinking, be conceived of as independent of truth. (pp. 132-133) 
 
3. Pedagogical strategies 
 
Another major complaint I want to register is that while obviously well intentioned, the 
pedagogical strategies Bowell and Kingsbury briefly suggest at the end of each theoretical 
discussion are to my mind the most substantive and important questions, but are unfortunately the 
most undeveloped aspect of their paper. Furthermore, at first blush I think they have not much 
prospect of success (on their own) in achieving what the authors desire: namely the mitigation of 
bias with the result of true beliefs. That standard for success is too high, and we should set our 
sights differently, by not focusing on the belief so much as on the character of students, and 
motivational tactics to influence the virtues that are so central to becoming a critical thinker. And 
in this respect their interventional strategies need much more development.  
I make the skeptical claim elsewhere (Hamby 2016) that in light of recent meta-analyses 
of  critical thinking instruction as well as the recent evidence that suggest cognitive biases are 
mostly intractable, it is a dubious proposition to think that widespread efforts at critical thinking 
will ever have the effect they desire. What Kingsbury and Bowell have in effect proposed in their 
paper is that some already tried but not always so true classroom strategies that may or may not 
have the effect that they intend them to have, but that sound fair and plausible enough, and are 
worth a try. By way of illustrating what I think is important in an approach to influencing the way 
students think, allow me now to quote at length the penultimate chapter of my doctoral thesis 
(Hamby 2014, pp. 123-155, 170-174, passim), where I both motivate and then articulate some 
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pedagogical strategies aimed at fostering the willingness to inquire, what I argue is the central 
critical thinking virtue. 
 
[A] fundamental aspect of becoming a critical thinker is to be able to 
recognize the need for reflection in the first place—to realize that something more 
than an automatic response is required. My position is that this kind of issue 
awareness should be the default attitude in a critical thinking class, permeating all 
instructional efforts. Out in the world, relying on heuristics for decisions that need 
to be made expeditiously is less problematic than when there is time for reflection 
in the classroom. Transferring this classroom attitude out into the world, however, 
is a problem that I will not pretend to solve. What we can do in our classroom 
activities is stress that our default attitude when confronting significant issues in 
our lives should be to pause to reflect, as opposed to making a snap judgment: it is 
not always so pressing to make an immediate decision that we should feel justified 
in failing to carefully reflect on an issue at hand. 
So it is not just any motivation we seek to foster, but the special motivation 
that is willingness to inquire: the motivation that drives a person to seek out 
reasoned judgment through critical inquiry, and that orients them towards 
recognizing controversial issues that deserve reflection. And we cannot hope to 
foster this in our students with the aim of educating critical thinkers who approach 
the ideal if we coerce, indoctrinate, or otherwise seek to foster the virtue with only 
external rewards. How else then should we seek to foster them? Like the moral 
virtues, critical thinking virtues are only properly acquired, if they are acquired at 
all, through practice and imitation; in this way the formula for critical thinking 
virtue-acquisition is analogous to the formula for critical thinking skill-acquisition, 
since we want students to emulate and adopt the kinds of attitudes required to be 
critical thinkers, and this will require feedback when instructors notice failures of 
proper attitudes. Whereas the “practice” part is not like skill acquisition, where 
some discrete task is attempted, still, instructors must put students in situations 
where their attitudes and values become manifest in dialectic with peers, and then 
those aspects are made explicit to the participants, when comments made could be 
made more open-mindedly, fair-mindedly, respectfully, etc. One important aspect 
of fostering willingness to inquire is thus for instructors to diligently manifest that 
virtue in our own thinking when interacting with students, inside or outside of class. 
Of course, if a critical thinking instructor is to be a true critical thinker herself, then 
she must already characteristically manifest willingness to inquire. But as an 
instructor, she must do so more conscientiously, and certainly more explicitly. In 
addition to conscientiously modeling willingness to inquire in classroom practice, 
instructors can design classroom activities that explicitly point to the virtues, and 
willingness to inquire in particular. The goal of such activities would be to impress 
upon students the instrumental and intrinsic importance of the proper motivation to 
be a critical thinker. Below, I explore the conscientious techniques of modeling 
willingness to inquire, and the classroom activities that through practice and 
repetition I argue will help to foster that virtue, and work to mitigate the tendency 
to be motivated to defend an unexamined view from alternatives, even when those 
alternatives should be compelling. The hope is that, as with skill transfer, the sorts 
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of attitudes and values that contribute to a person seeking reasoned judgment on 
the occasion of a classroom or take home assignment will transfer across contexts 
to their lives apart from their duties as a student. This hope can be maintained even 
in the light of criticisms like that of Leave (1988), who casts into doubt the idea of 
skills transfer by pointing to evidence which suggests that, even if skills sometimes 
transfer across educational contexts, such as from one class or subject to another, 
they do not always transfer to the world at large, outside of educational contexts (p. 
71). But while this may be true of skill transfer, and as critical thinking pedagogues 
we would hope there is more chance of “real world” transfer than Leave suggests, 
we need not be so pessimistic regarding the critical thinking virtues on this basis. 
For a virtue is not a skill, and is not used the way a skill is used. Indeed, part of the 
reason why skill transfer is not seen outside of educational contexts may be that the 
proper attitudes and motivation have not been properly fostered. Perhaps the 
solution to real-world transfer is an explicit focus on being the kind of person who 
seeks to engage in inquiry and uses her skills appropriately. 
One classroom exercise that can be repeated with slight variations involves 
students articulating “gut reactions” to certain news stories, narratives from history, 
interchanges between politicians on legislative floors, or even fictional dialogues. 
The phrase “gut reaction” is suggestive for students being introduced to the idea of 
willingness to inquire, because the very idea that one undertakes a critical stance in 
a process of inquiry is precluded if one hastily decides on a judgment before any 
such inquiry takes place. “Gut reaction” is also a fortunate phrase in this regard 
because if one is to think critically one must do so with one’s head, not with one’s 
gut. This allows instructors to introduce the idea of System-I thinking (“reactive, 
instinctive, quick, holistic”) versus System-II thinking (“reflective, deliberative, 
analytical, procedural”) (Facione & Gittens, 2012, p. 183), which is an instructive 
bit of knowledge that should help students become more cognizant of the need to 
approach some issues relying more on heuristics and training, but to approach 
others with a more reflective stance. So the very set-up of this classroom exercise 
tips off students that such thinking is not typical of a critical thinker. 
Part of that set-up should include the following quote from Stephen Colbert, 
which he made as the keynote speaker at the White House Press Club Dinner in 
2006. The tradition at these dinners is that the keynote speaker lampoons the 
President, who is always in attendance. At this event Colbert is lampooning then-
President George W. Bush, who is sitting a few seats away from him when the 
speech is delivered; however, the purpose of this set-up is not to make a political 
point. Rather it is to use irony to hit home the idea that gut reactions to things are 
very seldom productive of truth and certainly tend to produce something other than 
a reasoned judgment. To then defend such gut reactions at any cost is to add salt to 
the wound of an already injurious intellectual motivation. Below is the transcription 
of the relevant part of the speech: 
 
[T]onight it is my privilege to celebrate this president, ’cause we're 
not so different, he and I. We both get it. Guys like us, we’re not 
some brainiacs on the nerd patrol. We’re not members of the 
factinista. We go straight from the gut. Right, sir? That’s where the 
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truth lies, right down here in the gut. Do you know you have more 
nerve endings in your gut than you have in your head? You can look 
it up. Now, I know some of you are going to say, “I did look it up, 
and that's not true.” That's ’cause you looked it up in a book. Next 
time, look it up in your gut. I did. My gut tells me that’s how our 
nervous system works. Every night on my show, The Colbert 
Report, I speak straight from the gut, okay? I give people the truth, 
unfiltered by rational argument. I call it the "No Fact Zone”. 
 
After watching this video clip as part of the initial set up to the exercise, 
students are then prompted to defend gut reactions to issues by any rhetorical means 
necessary, ignoring or unreflectively downplaying alternative views. In effect, 
students are encouraged to be the most (intellectually) viciously motivated thinkers 
they can be in terms of maintaining their original gut reaction. In this way, students 
get to experience the contrary of willingness to inquire in a conscious, visceral way. 
They also get to see their peers engage in the artificially adopted error tendency, so 
have a firsthand view of how this cognitive bias can lead us all astray in our 
intellectual endeavours. This can yield dividends in impressing upon students the 
importance of being motivated to seek a reasoned judgment because a gut reaction 
will tend not to be the most defensible position on an issue compared to a judgment 
reached carefully through an examination of a wide array of evidence and 
arguments. 
 The point of an exercise such as this is to reinforce the importance of 
seeking a reasoned judgment even in the face of a view one already holds. But it is 
also a warning against using a snap judgment in a context where one is not 
appropriate. This too is a way of illustrating willingness to inquire, because to be 
the kind of person who characteristically seeks a reasoned judgment means to be 
the kind of person who does not rely too heavily on heuristics unless they are 
warranted. As such, this kind of exercise is appropriate for introducing students to 
the heuristic strategies that are sometimes effective, but that do not represent the 
kind of reflective thinking that critical inquiry represents. 
Another classroom intervention that has the potential to get students into the 
habit of looking at questions through a critical lens with the aim of reaching a 
reasoned judgment is to design written in class assignments so that they are done 
in groups rather than individually. Assignments that require students to submit 
work individually perpetuates the idea that critical thinking is a solo intellectual 
exercise. But critical thinking is properly seen as more than just an internal mental 
process that people undertake without regard to their external environment. This is 
especially true when one considers that other people, other thinking people, make 
up a good part of our external environment. Respect for dialectical partners has 
already been shown to be an important virtue that is necessary for a person to have 
if she is to be a critical thinker approaching the ideal. So too, as mentioned above, 
is valuing the criticisms that others might legitimately make in response to our 
arguments and cases. This can be assured to be undertaken by students if peer 
evaluation is part of the assignment, to mitigate the potential for some students in 
groups to do the minimum work possible and allow others to do the work. Therefore 
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written assignments should at least in part be undertaken in groups, where students 
must work together to meet a common goal of reaching a judgment on balance.  
This can help to foster willingness to inquire as well, in the following way: 
by organizing the group inquiry process methodically, requiring students to share 
the intellectual burden of discovering the evidence and arguments on various sides 
of the issue, by an intelligent division of labour in the inquiry process. As an 
illustration, see the following excerpt from an assignment for a final group inquiry 
essay in a second year undergraduate business ethics course. This assignment is 
more than a group assignment, in that it asks students to go through a full blown 
process of inquiry as a group.  
 
You will need to consider plausible objections to your position, 
rejoinders to those objections, implications of your position, and 
alternatives with their supporting arguments–in effect, considering 
carefully the strongest responses to your core argument or 
arguments that a supporter of some other position could make. This 
is part of the role different group members with different ideas will 
play in contributing to the report: everyone with alternative 
perspectives should contribute those perspectives to the group’s 
process of balancing different arguments in order to come to a 
reasoned judgment on the issue you determine the case prompts. If 
there is a uniformity of perspectives among group members, then 
group members should undertake a concerted effort to think of the 
strongest alternatives, dividing the intellectual labour of the group 
to gather the various perspectives that must be considered in order 
to come to a reasoned judgment on balance. 
 
The assignment from which the above was taken is based on a case study. The 
assignment asks students to formulate the various issues the case brings to the fore; 
it asks them to contemplate the various sides of the major issue they decide is 
operative in the case; and it asks them to balance the considerations against one 
another in a process of reasoning that leads to a reasoned judgment about the major 
moral issue involved in the case. It specifically asks them to divide these various 
components amongst themselves, so that each group member is responsible for at 
least one line of argumentative thought that they must then incorporate into a 
dialectical exchange with their other group members in an attempt to reach a 
reasoned judgment.  
The rationale for this approach is that requiring students to go through a 
process of reasoning that is clearly only one element in an undertaking that involves 
a total balance of considerations judgment has the potential to reinforce in students’ 
minds the totality of lines of reasoning that are required for such a reasoned 
judgment to be reached. In other words students get to experience the process of 
reaching a reasoned judgment in such a methodical way that it slows down that 
process and breaks it into its constituent lines of reasoning, each of which deserves 
its own careful attention. This argument-building towards a conclusion, when it 
happens at all, is often the last step in an undergraduate’s reasoning. To attempt to 
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support a claim with an argument or a series of arguments is not enough, however, 
to reach a reasoned judgment. For the argumentation that is involved when the 
dialectical obligations of the arguer are taken seriously is what this assignment tries 
to stress. As such, a student will be reminded at every stage of this assignment that 
her own approach to the issue for the sake of the assignment is only one of a few 
potential approaches, and that whether some approach is better justified will only 
become clear as the arguments are compared to each other and as the dialectical 
space between them is made explicit. 
 Since critical thinking is directed towards reasoned judgment, willingness 
to inquire should be fostered in a way that pays attention to that end. Fostering 
willingness to inquire thus is about instilling a value for reasoned judgment as the 
primary end of critical inquiry, especially relative to other ends to which our 
intellectual efforts could be put. Classroom interventions thus should all pay 
explicit attention to other intellectual ends that instructors might witness students 
pursuing other than reasoned judgment. Not only can instructors be on the lookout 
for other such motivations in the classroom, but students themselves should be 
encouraged to self-monitor and peer-monitor for the end-directed activities that do 
not fall in line with reaching a reasoned judgment or that might otherwise tend to 
work against such a process. 
Another strategy that could be employed to foster willingness to inquire 
stands opposed to the typical inclination of critical thinking instructors to organize 
some kind of “debate” as a project. While requiring a debate as an aspect of class 
design might be appropriate in a debate or public speaking course, in a critical 
thinking course it might turn out to be antithetical to the goals of instruction, 
especially if my conceptualization of critical thinking is granted. For debate 
scenarios are naturally adversarial, but critical thinking should be seen as 
cooperative; debate is furthermore a matter of persuasion rather than of 
justification, whereas critical thinking is about reaching a conclusion on a balance 
of considerations; dialectic disappears in debate and concessions and revisions are 
failings and weaknesses, at least when debate is pursued in a dominantly eristic 
fashion, but in critical thinking, and in a critical thinking class, an eristic approach 
and debate framed by opposition is not the best approach if we want to foster 
people’s attitudes and values so that they will be the kind of people who seek a 
judgment reached on balance. Since that judgment cannot be foretold, and to revise 
one’s views appropriately in light of new evidence is one of the greatest successes 
a critical thinker can have, an eristic approach to debate will tend to foster attitudes 
antithetical to the critical thinking virtues. 
This is all to say that debate as an eristic pursuit is not the proper activity 
for a critical thinking class. But this is not to say that people cannot disagree, or 
dispute different positions, or that people should not be encouraged to actively 
engage each other on the points which they do disagree. It is not to say framing 
some issues pro and con is not legitimate. Rather, it is to say that the purpose and 
organization of debate must change. First, debate can no longer be about defending 
an entrenched view at all costs, with the expectation that at the end of the 
communicative exchange, something will necessarily be resolved. This stands 
directly opposed not only to debate as it is traditionally instructed in the United 
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States, but also to an alternative approach to argumentation from Europe, found in 
the pragma-dialecticians Van Eemeren and Grootendorst. For them, argumentation 
is about resolving a difference of opinion, and in the extended pragma-dialectical 
theory that allows for strategic manoeuvring, there are the goals of the participants: 
of the protagonist to justify their standpoint and of the antagonist to prevent the 
protagonist from doing so. 
But in a critical thinking class, what kind of resolution can we hope to 
expect when 1) the disagreement concerns issues of real and contemporary 
controversy that are actively debated and 2) most students are being introduced to 
the explicit skills of critical thinking and the dispositions of critical thinkers for the 
first time? The answer is that we should not expect or even trouble to spend too 
much effort on making the resolution of disagreement our goal of critical thinking. 
Therefore, while we should be realistic and assume that students come to an 
introductory critical thinking course with strong beliefs and complicated ways of 
understanding those beliefs, we should not expect that those beliefs will change too 
drastically as a result of instruction. Rather, the expectation of the reality of student 
disagreement should be that the basis of that disagreement be made more clear, that 
it be articulated as fairly and as clearly as possible so that it is understood, and that 
it is examined in as fair a light as possible. The end sought is not resolution of 
disagreement based on agreed upon starting points and rules of inference, but some 
judgment that is known only when inquiry pauses to assess all the relevant 
information and arguments and evidence, to find that, for this moment at least, the 
cases for the various sides have been made and the verdict can be rendered 
provisionally, until new evidence or argument can be brought to bear on the 
process.  
How to have contrary arguments, then, allowing students to express their 
ideas and their beliefs and their disagreements, while emphasizing the special ends 
of critical thinking? If some way can be devised, then willingness to inquire can be 
fostered, because positive experiences aiming towards something other than 
winning or persuading might lead students to want to have more of those 
experiences more often, and will thereby be a motivational factor when out in the 
real world where disagreements arise. 
My answer to the problem of reconceiving the critical thinking debate 
activity is a simple pedagogical plan that involves the whole class, but as in a 
debate, spotlights two people and their opposing views. The set up is simple: two 
chairs at the front of the classroom, so the participating students can see one 
another. The rules of the exchange are simple as well: there is a question at issue, 
the question phrased according to the criteria of a well-stated issue. The participants 
are to address the question, with the only caveat being that they disagree either in 
their “gut response” to the issue if it is something they have not reflected about, or 
about their current judgment on the issue, whatever it happens to be. Then the 
procedure is as follows: they each give their reasons for their belief, whatever it is. 
This involves stating not just their reasons but also their belief. Once each 
participant has stated their belief and their reasons for their belief, each participant 
gets a chance to respond to the other person. Before a response can be given, 
however, the position being responded to must be articulated to the satisfaction of 
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the person who first articulated it. Only when an alternative view is articulated to 
the satisfaction of the person whose view it is can that view than be responded to.  
This serves a number of purposes, all of which work towards fostering 
willingness to inquire, in addition to other virtues, and other skills for that matter. 
Since paraphrasing is such an important academic and intellectual skill, for 
instance, this experience is important in that it requires students to put into their 
own words the positions of others. This is made more challenging by the fact that 
these views are at odds with a student’s own view, and that the person is sitting in 
front of them, and that the disagreement is occurring in a public place with 
onlookers.  But this is just the sort of realistic skill we expect students to be able to 
apply across a wide range of texts and other communicative messages, whether face 
to face or through interpreting mass media. But willingness to inquire is specifically 
fostered in such an activity for the following reason: “success” in this “debate” is 
not a matter of winning, but of following the paraphrasing rule well. Ideally, the 
way practiced critical thinkers would behave in such a situation is to very rarely 
have to be corrected by their “opponent” in the debate. So that the giving and 
exchanging of reasons would flow with a minimum of correction, or at a least a 
maximum of sensitive, conscientious, fair, and open-minded correction, all with the 
immediate end of articulating well the other person’s position. Now onto some 
other take home pedagogical content. 
This content is inspired by and borrows from Battaly (2006), an important 
paper that argues for a theoretical understanding of the intellectual virtues from the 
perspective of virtue epistemology, and that attempts to answer the question of how 
we can “cultivate intellectual virtue in our students” (p. 191). Battaly helpfully 
articulates some plausible classroom interventions and take-home assignments 
meant to foster such intellectual virtues as open-mindedness, a motivation for the 
truth, and a respect for evidence (pp. 210-218 passim). As such, Battaly’s effort 
anticipates my aims, providing an important account of the kinds of pedagogical 
interventions that an instructor who recognizes the importance of the intellectual 
virtues can use in her classroom practice.  
Battaly’s discussion is situated in the virtue epistemology debate of the 
virtues, a debate that I have sought to avoid, because addressing relevant 
epistemological concerns would take me far afield. Still, Battaly’s efforts to 
theoretically elucidate the concept of an intellectual virtue, and to provide 
classroom tactics to instruct for the intellectual virtues, are evidence that 
recognizing cognitive virtues in the classroom, as opposed to strictly moral virtues, 
can be taken seriously by pedagogues. Critical thinking instructors thus need not 
immerse themselves in the debate among virtue epistemologists to take the critical 
thinking virtues seriously, but the upshot of Battaly’s article can still be 
appropriated by them. This is to say that, following Battaly, while instructing for 
the intellectual virtues is a fallible endeavour, we should nevertheless proceed with 
confidence in our instruction, believing that giving students an opportunity to 
practice the virtues is better than giving them no opportunities at all, and that these 
opportunities will help to foster in them a desire to put their skills into practice as a 
part of their routine and characteristic way of interacting in the world (p. 218). In 
this way Battaly rightly expresses optimism about explicitly teaching the 
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intellectual virtues, modeling them in classroom practice, and most importantly, 
allowing students various curricular ways to practice the virtues. Such efforts 
attempt to give students an opportunity to consciously aim for the virtues, and to 
notice them and be more cognizant of them in various real-life discourses. My 
approach to the instruction of the critical thinking virtues takes this optimism as a 
constructive starting point for what I take to be plausible programmatic suggestions 
with some implications. 
The first implication is that critical thinking education is a kind of character 
education. This is problematic for a number of reasons, perhaps most of all for 
political reasons: if critical thinking is about educating for character, then it has a 
strong moral dimension that some would surely claim should be kept out of our 
educational efforts. Education, especially public education, should not be about 
instilling morals, but about teaching skills that will lead to professional and 
intellectual development.  
However . . . abstracting a person’s skills from the kind of person they need 
to be to employ them consistently and aptly is a mistake. If we want students not 
just to be able to do certain things, but to be the kind of people who actually do 
them of their own accord, then education should be about more than instruction in 
the techniques that allow a person to engage in a process or procedure. If we think 
that a process or procedure is valuable enough to teach, we should want to 
encourage our students to value it too, in such a way that they will want to learn it 
and eventually apply it in their lives as a regular part of their experience in the 
world. 
To this end, critical thinking pedagogues should be aware of current 
scholarship in critical thinking pedagogy. In light of a recent meta-analysis of 
studies evaluating instructional efforts at critical thinking, undertaken by Abrami, 
et al (2008), pedagogues should understand that if they wish to foster critical 
thinking in their students, they must do so explicitly as an additional part of their 
curricular instruction “as an independent track within a specific content course” 
(2008, p. 1121). This strategy, according to Abrami’s meta-analysis, has a better 
chance of fostering the skills and virtues of students than does the “immersion” 
method of using already existing curriculum and expecting students to learn critical 
thinking “as a by-product of instruction” (2008, p. 1121). It also has a better chance 
of good outcomes than the “general” approach, where critical thinking skills “are 
the explicit course objective”, and the “infusion” approach, where critical thinking 
skills “are embedded into course content and explicitly stated as a course objective” 
(2008, p. 1121).  
The upshot regarding the instruction of the virtues is analogous to Abrami’s 
conclusion regarding the instruction of critical thinking more generally: to 
recognize the importance of the virtues is not enough, if in our instruction we do 
not pay explicit attention to them. Recognition of the pedagogical value of the 
virtues brings me to a second major implication: just as pedagogues might wish to 
instil critical thinking skills into their students but will tend to fail to do so unless 
that instruction is made explicit as an independent track of content within a 
curriculum, so I surmise will the critical thinking virtues fail to develop in our 
students if we as instructors are merely aware of them, and seek to “infuse” them 
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into our already existing curriculum without paying explicit attention to them in 
separate lectures and in specifically tailored assignments we require our students to 
complete. 
Critical thinking virtues thus deserve their own place among the standard 
curricular topics in a critical thinking course, which tend to stress the skills of 
critical thinking. Just as there are commonly units on using language 
unambiguously, analyzing arguments, and evaluating sources, so there should be 
units on open-mindedness, valuing fallacious-free reasoning, charity, and 
willingness to inquire. These need not be full-blown lessons taking up one or more 
entire 50-minute class periods, or full chapters in textbooks. Mini-lessons and 
lectures of 15 to 20 minutes, coupled with in-class assignments, take-home 
assignments, and other reading assignments, could be sufficient. They would do 
more than what is now typical, which is to neglect any mention of the virtues at all. 
So my conclusion is to urge instructors that to pursue critical thinking virtues in the 
classroom they must work to make them a clearly defined and separate aspect of 
their course, so that the ideas and the activities are delineated for students as those 




In sum, I agree with the Kingsbury’s and Bowell’s project: we should try to get students to think 
critically about beliefs it is hard to think critically about. In other words, we should get students to 
think critically. The strategies for the one are the same for the other, and fostering student 
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